A vague idea

Initially, it is useful to think about concepts in general terms, with few specifics. At first blush, we should consider citizenship and service in broad terms. For one thing, this is how the political discourse takes place: with grand concepts that can generate a broad base of support. For another, it is useful to start any sort of analysis with a general theory or idea
The idea of sweeping generalities should make us hesitate, however. For example, when we talk about service in general terms, we run the risk of eliding over some possibly important differences among service experiences. What happens when we say all service activities are the “same”? That is, can we reasonably claim that it does not matter in terms of outcomes for the individual what kind or quality of service a person undertakes?
Consider service learning. We could say that since the underlying pedagogy is the same, that the outcomes will be similar, if not the same. This claim is not as simplistic or easy as it seems. Such a claim argues that service activities have a certain impact on socio/moral development (or whatever you term the psycho/social stage-based development) that are the same at the core. Individual identity is the unit of analysis and the model assumes service activities have the same basic components to develop that identity. In this vein of thinking, the substantive outcomes of service learning are not the only outcomes, nor are they the unifying aspects of the service experience. For example, one service learning program could involve students volunteering in a day center for people experiencing homelessness and reflecting on their experiences as part of a unit on poverty. And another program might consist of writing and reflecting on students’ experiences in a public health awareness campaign. A model that posits all service experiences are basically the same assumes that both of these experiences enhance individuals’ levels of social trust (by creating a sense of efficacy), and increase sense of agency.
But does this general model truly capture the impact of service on the individual? Ward and Wolf-Wendel (2000) posit that there are differences among the underlying pedagogies of service learning programs that can have substantially different impacts on individuals. They address the underlying ethos of service learning programs, particularly contrasting those programs that are built around the model of the “citizen as helper” versus those that position the “citizen as social change agent”. Accepting that these are not necessarily mutually exclusive orientations, the differences should still raise a red flag for those that claim all service is the same. Just at first glance, an emphasis on one model of citizenship over another could mean a difference in identity formation. That is, emphasis on the “citizen as a helper” may create a tendency towards individualistic action. But emphasis on the “citizen as social change agent” might make individuals more favorable to the notion of collective action.
Thus, can it be the case that the internal processes that translate service experiences into identity formation filter out these differences? Do the underlying pedagogical orientations of service activities just “not matter”?

A (quick logic) for civic education

What is civic education (in a formal sense) meant to be? Forming responsible members of the collective? Creating individuals more likely to engage in pro-social behaviors?

At the heart of the concept of civic education is the notion that the state has an interest in the moral development of its citizens and that moral reasoning is central to the development of citizenship. To investigate this idea, it is first necessary to deconstruct the concept of "moral reasoning". First, it is a process. Moral reasoning is first, an active experience. Whether you consider the constructivist approach to moral development of Kohlberg and Piaget, or even a less explicitly defined stage theory, moral reasoning connotes some sort of cognitive activity.

Second, most philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists, to the extent that they agree on the subject of moral reasoning, agree that there is some sort of conscious undertaking whereby abstract concepts are synthesized into a more complete framework to shape the actor's actions. The substance of this framework is less frequently agreed upon (is it values centered or not?).

Finally, moral reasoning is a process with an internal locus of control. Though moral reasoning may be spurred on in its development by external factors, the procedure is ultimately internal. Thus, I would argue that part of developing a coherent, consistent moral logic is essential to developing an empowered individual. From this, I would argue that moral "agency" is essential to the development of a moral citizen. This concept comes from Robert Coles' (1986) work on the moral development of children. Coles argued that moral development occurs from the experience of the moral dilemmas of one's daily life, not from viewing the dilemmas of others (Kohlberg). Through experience and feedback, particularly from adults around them, children use and develop a moral framework with themselves at the center of it, not on the outside looking in.