Today was a busy day at the University of Texas at Austin.
First, the 40+ acres saw almost 50,000 new faces as part of the University's "Explore UT" event. This is an annual event which attracts students, teachers and parents from all over the state of Texas ranging from the very young to high school age youth, meant to introduce them to college. Different schools, programs and activities across campus plan events to engage, entertain, and enlighten parents, kids, and teachers and to welcome them to the University as potential future members. The LBJ School of Public Affairs invited visitors to make buttons, with an eye towards the elections and political expression throughout the year. (There was also a popcorn machine, which quite honestly delighted the graduate volunteers almost as much as the visiting students.)
For some reason, today's activities struck me more than I anticipated, especially given that it was a relatively short event (only one day). We got to watch service learning in action. It had many of the elements of an ideal service experience: it was face to face, it was intergenerational, it was topical. I cannot count how many Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton buttons I made. And there were definitely more than a few buttons with "[insert child's name here] for Senate" or "President". There were also several that said, "[insert child's name here] is a Southside gangster for life" and the one I refused to make: "Dominique Rodriguez is ugly." But that's the point. We talked about it. We interacted. I made 4 buttons for myself.
Moreover, the parking lots were filled with school buses and charter buses. Several chaperones said they had driven 5 or 6 hours, on a bus, to come to the event. To me, this means that educators understand the value of service learning, are willing to take the time for it, but need some help. The University, as a separate institution, provided valuable resources for the experience; resources above and beyond what primary and secondary educational institutions are able to provide.
I could go on and on about the day, but my shoulder hurts from operating the button machine, so I'll turn to another event on campus today:
The Center for Ethical Leadership at the LBJ School is also holding its annual leadership conference this weekend. The conference is designed to introduce undergraduate students from across the country to critical leadership education. There are distinguished speakers, breakout sessions and activities intended to provoke students to think about effective and ethical leadership, and hopefully be inspired to practice it at their own institutions and throughout their lives. One of the speakers this morning was Dr. Chris Meyers Asch, who, with his colleague Shawn Raymond, is leading the effort to start the U.S. Public Service Academy.
His talk was a sort of quick and dirty narrative about motivations to civic service, types of service and, of course, why we should create an academy modeled on the military service academies to train people to serve. He spoke about the need to create a national "mission" to serve, about service as a means of transmitting values and morals, and about education as a public good. He highlighted the point that "expectations matter," in the classroom and also as a society. He was engaging and inspiring, but also substantive in his prescription for an entirely new institution to make service to this country a goal of America's best and brightest young people.
Tomorrow, I'll blog on the questions I asked about the next policy steps for the Academy and the distinctions between public service, social entrepreneurship, and community leadership.
Saturday, March 1, 2008
Tuesday, February 19, 2008
Princeton University's bold service ambition
Princeton is preparing to offer a year abroad, doing social service work in foreign countries for students before the students enter college. The initiative, called “Princeton in the World,” implicitly integrates several key arguments for service, and even includes an element of the compulsory.
The President of the Institute of International Education, in an interview with the New York Times, expressed that first-year students are “too young when they start college.” It seems that he is not necessarily referring to the numeric age of students, but rather their developmental stage.
Further, one of the stated benefits to students is that such service would “prepare students for a more meaningful Princeton experience.” This is the essence of a pragmatic educational paradigm: experience will deepen the meaning of classroom learning.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the proposal is the notion that such an experience would be mandatory and that an institution has a role in prescribing what may be best for students developmentally. Though Princeton is a private university, there is an idea bound up in this proposal with broader implications. This institution historically charged with developing youth has recognized that there is a disconnect between what the institution should do and what it is doing, and the way to ameliorate the disconnect is with a particular type of experience. Moreover, the institution (with elements of state/public funding) has identified that this experience is so important, so vital to the healthy development of individuals, that the experience may ultimately be mandatory for all incoming students.
This initiative is certainly one to watch.
The President of the Institute of International Education, in an interview with the New York Times, expressed that first-year students are “too young when they start college.” It seems that he is not necessarily referring to the numeric age of students, but rather their developmental stage.
Further, one of the stated benefits to students is that such service would “prepare students for a more meaningful Princeton experience.” This is the essence of a pragmatic educational paradigm: experience will deepen the meaning of classroom learning.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the proposal is the notion that such an experience would be mandatory and that an institution has a role in prescribing what may be best for students developmentally. Though Princeton is a private university, there is an idea bound up in this proposal with broader implications. This institution historically charged with developing youth has recognized that there is a disconnect between what the institution should do and what it is doing, and the way to ameliorate the disconnect is with a particular type of experience. Moreover, the institution (with elements of state/public funding) has identified that this experience is so important, so vital to the healthy development of individuals, that the experience may ultimately be mandatory for all incoming students.
This initiative is certainly one to watch.
Tuesday, January 29, 2008
Citizenship (again)
Veteran public servant and even longer-term political observer Ted Van Dyk recently spoke to students at the LBJ School of Public Affairs about his new book, “Heroes, Hacks and Fools: Memoirs from the Political Inside”. I have not had a chance to read the book, though after hearing Mr. Van Dyk speak, it sounds right up the alley of a West Wing junkie.
After Mr. Van Dyk spoke, he took questions from the audience. Someone asked him about the current election cycle and after talking briefly about various candidates’ chances, he made the comment that elected officials and those getting the officials elected were in the service of the public and should not forget that. In fact, he said he found it “disgusting” how some elected leaders tended to forget.
Several weeks later, this thought continues to strike me as interesting. Mr. Van Dyk used the word “service” several times during his talk. For him, it seems, political participation at the highest levels is an expression of service. It is not difficult to make the intellectual leap that, in this view, participation is an ideal expression of citizenship as well. By self-admission, Mr. Van Dyk is a child of the Depression, and he brings that historical imagination
This view is interesting to me because it highlights a problem I am having conceptualizing service; the problem of the ideal citizen. That is, what makes a good citizen? The answer to this question both depends on and informs the view of democracy I take. It informs the standard for individual actions, values and mores. Determining what a “good” citizen is tells us about the kind of society we want to live in.
Westheimer and Kahne (2004) articulate a framework of citizenship education, arguing that there are three basic perspectives that inform citizenship education in schools. They note that their list is not exhaustive of all conceptualizations of citizenship, but rather indicative of the perspectives behind formal citizenship education. Their articulations of the “personally responsible citizen,” the “participatory citizen,” and the “justice-oriented citizen” deserve further exploration.
Yet the aspect of their analysis that spurred me to thought is the implicit argument that not all pro-social attitudes and behaviors are inherently necessary for democratic citizenship. For instance, integrity is a good thing. It is a quality we want to teach our children, but is integrity per se absolutely necessary for democratic citizenship? Finally, am I focused on a task-based definition, or a values/intention-based definition? That is, what kind of noun is citizenship? Is it a role, a quality, a combination of qualities, a process, or an action?
After Mr. Van Dyk spoke, he took questions from the audience. Someone asked him about the current election cycle and after talking briefly about various candidates’ chances, he made the comment that elected officials and those getting the officials elected were in the service of the public and should not forget that. In fact, he said he found it “disgusting” how some elected leaders tended to forget.
Several weeks later, this thought continues to strike me as interesting. Mr. Van Dyk used the word “service” several times during his talk. For him, it seems, political participation at the highest levels is an expression of service. It is not difficult to make the intellectual leap that, in this view, participation is an ideal expression of citizenship as well. By self-admission, Mr. Van Dyk is a child of the Depression, and he brings that historical imagination
This view is interesting to me because it highlights a problem I am having conceptualizing service; the problem of the ideal citizen. That is, what makes a good citizen? The answer to this question both depends on and informs the view of democracy I take. It informs the standard for individual actions, values and mores. Determining what a “good” citizen is tells us about the kind of society we want to live in.
Westheimer and Kahne (2004) articulate a framework of citizenship education, arguing that there are three basic perspectives that inform citizenship education in schools. They note that their list is not exhaustive of all conceptualizations of citizenship, but rather indicative of the perspectives behind formal citizenship education. Their articulations of the “personally responsible citizen,” the “participatory citizen,” and the “justice-oriented citizen” deserve further exploration.
Yet the aspect of their analysis that spurred me to thought is the implicit argument that not all pro-social attitudes and behaviors are inherently necessary for democratic citizenship. For instance, integrity is a good thing. It is a quality we want to teach our children, but is integrity per se absolutely necessary for democratic citizenship? Finally, am I focused on a task-based definition, or a values/intention-based definition? That is, what kind of noun is citizenship? Is it a role, a quality, a combination of qualities, a process, or an action?
Wednesday, November 28, 2007
A vague idea
Initially, it is useful to think about concepts in general terms, with few specifics. At first blush, we should consider citizenship and service in broad terms. For one thing, this is how the political discourse takes place: with grand concepts that can generate a broad base of support. For another, it is useful to start any sort of analysis with a general theory or idea
The idea of sweeping generalities should make us hesitate, however. For example, when we talk about service in general terms, we run the risk of eliding over some possibly important differences among service experiences. What happens when we say all service activities are the “same”? That is, can we reasonably claim that it does not matter in terms of outcomes for the individual what kind or quality of service a person undertakes?
Consider service learning. We could say that since the underlying pedagogy is the same, that the outcomes will be similar, if not the same. This claim is not as simplistic or easy as it seems. Such a claim argues that service activities have a certain impact on socio/moral development (or whatever you term the psycho/social stage-based development) that are the same at the core. Individual identity is the unit of analysis and the model assumes service activities have the same basic components to develop that identity. In this vein of thinking, the substantive outcomes of service learning are not the only outcomes, nor are they the unifying aspects of the service experience. For example, one service learning program could involve students volunteering in a day center for people experiencing homelessness and reflecting on their experiences as part of a unit on poverty. And another program might consist of writing and reflecting on students’ experiences in a public health awareness campaign. A model that posits all service experiences are basically the same assumes that both of these experiences enhance individuals’ levels of social trust (by creating a sense of efficacy), and increase sense of agency.
But does this general model truly capture the impact of service on the individual? Ward and Wolf-Wendel (2000) posit that there are differences among the underlying pedagogies of service learning programs that can have substantially different impacts on individuals. They address the underlying ethos of service learning programs, particularly contrasting those programs that are built around the model of the “citizen as helper” versus those that position the “citizen as social change agent”. Accepting that these are not necessarily mutually exclusive orientations, the differences should still raise a red flag for those that claim all service is the same. Just at first glance, an emphasis on one model of citizenship over another could mean a difference in identity formation. That is, emphasis on the “citizen as a helper” may create a tendency towards individualistic action. But emphasis on the “citizen as social change agent” might make individuals more favorable to the notion of collective action.
Thus, can it be the case that the internal processes that translate service experiences into identity formation filter out these differences? Do the underlying pedagogical orientations of service activities just “not matter”?
The idea of sweeping generalities should make us hesitate, however. For example, when we talk about service in general terms, we run the risk of eliding over some possibly important differences among service experiences. What happens when we say all service activities are the “same”? That is, can we reasonably claim that it does not matter in terms of outcomes for the individual what kind or quality of service a person undertakes?
Consider service learning. We could say that since the underlying pedagogy is the same, that the outcomes will be similar, if not the same. This claim is not as simplistic or easy as it seems. Such a claim argues that service activities have a certain impact on socio/moral development (or whatever you term the psycho/social stage-based development) that are the same at the core. Individual identity is the unit of analysis and the model assumes service activities have the same basic components to develop that identity. In this vein of thinking, the substantive outcomes of service learning are not the only outcomes, nor are they the unifying aspects of the service experience. For example, one service learning program could involve students volunteering in a day center for people experiencing homelessness and reflecting on their experiences as part of a unit on poverty. And another program might consist of writing and reflecting on students’ experiences in a public health awareness campaign. A model that posits all service experiences are basically the same assumes that both of these experiences enhance individuals’ levels of social trust (by creating a sense of efficacy), and increase sense of agency.
But does this general model truly capture the impact of service on the individual? Ward and Wolf-Wendel (2000) posit that there are differences among the underlying pedagogies of service learning programs that can have substantially different impacts on individuals. They address the underlying ethos of service learning programs, particularly contrasting those programs that are built around the model of the “citizen as helper” versus those that position the “citizen as social change agent”. Accepting that these are not necessarily mutually exclusive orientations, the differences should still raise a red flag for those that claim all service is the same. Just at first glance, an emphasis on one model of citizenship over another could mean a difference in identity formation. That is, emphasis on the “citizen as a helper” may create a tendency towards individualistic action. But emphasis on the “citizen as social change agent” might make individuals more favorable to the notion of collective action.
Thus, can it be the case that the internal processes that translate service experiences into identity formation filter out these differences? Do the underlying pedagogical orientations of service activities just “not matter”?
Monday, November 5, 2007
A (quick logic) for civic education
What is civic education (in a formal sense) meant to be? Forming responsible members of the collective? Creating individuals more likely to engage in pro-social behaviors?
At the heart of the concept of civic education is the notion that the state has an interest in the moral development of its citizens and that moral reasoning is central to the development of citizenship. To investigate this idea, it is first necessary to deconstruct the concept of "moral reasoning". First, it is a process. Moral reasoning is first, an active experience. Whether you consider the constructivist approach to moral development of Kohlberg and Piaget, or even a less explicitly defined stage theory, moral reasoning connotes some sort of cognitive activity.
Second, most philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists, to the extent that they agree on the subject of moral reasoning, agree that there is some sort of conscious undertaking whereby abstract concepts are synthesized into a more complete framework to shape the actor's actions. The substance of this framework is less frequently agreed upon (is it values centered or not?).
Finally, moral reasoning is a process with an internal locus of control. Though moral reasoning may be spurred on in its development by external factors, the procedure is ultimately internal. Thus, I would argue that part of developing a coherent, consistent moral logic is essential to developing an empowered individual. From this, I would argue that moral "agency" is essential to the development of a moral citizen. This concept comes from Robert Coles' (1986) work on the moral development of children. Coles argued that moral development occurs from the experience of the moral dilemmas of one's daily life, not from viewing the dilemmas of others (Kohlberg). Through experience and feedback, particularly from adults around them, children use and develop a moral framework with themselves at the center of it, not on the outside looking in.
At the heart of the concept of civic education is the notion that the state has an interest in the moral development of its citizens and that moral reasoning is central to the development of citizenship. To investigate this idea, it is first necessary to deconstruct the concept of "moral reasoning". First, it is a process. Moral reasoning is first, an active experience. Whether you consider the constructivist approach to moral development of Kohlberg and Piaget, or even a less explicitly defined stage theory, moral reasoning connotes some sort of cognitive activity.
Second, most philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists, to the extent that they agree on the subject of moral reasoning, agree that there is some sort of conscious undertaking whereby abstract concepts are synthesized into a more complete framework to shape the actor's actions. The substance of this framework is less frequently agreed upon (is it values centered or not?).
Finally, moral reasoning is a process with an internal locus of control. Though moral reasoning may be spurred on in its development by external factors, the procedure is ultimately internal. Thus, I would argue that part of developing a coherent, consistent moral logic is essential to developing an empowered individual. From this, I would argue that moral "agency" is essential to the development of a moral citizen. This concept comes from Robert Coles' (1986) work on the moral development of children. Coles argued that moral development occurs from the experience of the moral dilemmas of one's daily life, not from viewing the dilemmas of others (Kohlberg). Through experience and feedback, particularly from adults around them, children use and develop a moral framework with themselves at the center of it, not on the outside looking in.
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
Cognitive approaches to moral development
If we are concerned with young people and how they interact with their communities, we must be interested in the pscyho-social factors that influence children and adolescents to act the way they do. On this occasion, I am interested in "moral development"; that is, what are the prevailing theories regarding moral (and to some extent, social) development? Moreover, why should we care?
The foundational theory of moral development belongs to Jean Piaget, who posited that there are cognitive structures that develop in late childhood and early adolescence which are linked to stages of development of moral reasoning in young people (1965). Piaget constructed a set of "moral experiments" to test attitudes and behaviors in young children and the differences in slightly older children. He found that young children tend to understand and conceptualize morality in terms of obedience to authority figures (adults) whereas older children think about morality in terms of peer groups. Older children, he observed, displayed a sense of reciprocity and empathy, due possibly to the fact that their social environments consisted primarily of interactions within an "egalitarian" peer group.
Lawrence Kohlberg (1971, 1976, 1978) used this notion of the relationship between cognitive structural development and moral understanding/behavior to argue that there are a defined number of cognitive structures, that develop in a series, that are tied to conceptions of "justice" in adolescents. Moreover, he claimed (convincingly to many) that these stages are universal across different societies.
This is by no means an exhaustive view of theories of moral development, but it is important to note the influence of Piaget and Kohlberg on current understandings of child social and emotional development. The notion of "service-learning" embodies this Kohlbergian constructivist-psychological framework (whether consciously or not). That is, service-learning, as a pedagogical approach, assumes that conceptions of justice and reciprocity are developing at a certain stage (K-12) and those conceptions may be enhanced through exposure to diverse environments. In fact, Kohlberg's theory applied in the educational context relies heavily on John Dewey's ideas of experiential education.
I would argue that this is precisely why we should care about the prevailing psycho-social view of "moral development": because this view is informing how children are educated in public schools. I will be exploring challenges to Kohlberg's theories in terms of actual pro-social behavior on the part of adolescents in a post later this week. For more on cognitive approaches to moral development see Colby, A. & Kohlberg, L. (1987) The measurement of moral judgment. Volume 1: Theoretical foundations and research validation.
The foundational theory of moral development belongs to Jean Piaget, who posited that there are cognitive structures that develop in late childhood and early adolescence which are linked to stages of development of moral reasoning in young people (1965). Piaget constructed a set of "moral experiments" to test attitudes and behaviors in young children and the differences in slightly older children. He found that young children tend to understand and conceptualize morality in terms of obedience to authority figures (adults) whereas older children think about morality in terms of peer groups. Older children, he observed, displayed a sense of reciprocity and empathy, due possibly to the fact that their social environments consisted primarily of interactions within an "egalitarian" peer group.
Lawrence Kohlberg (1971, 1976, 1978) used this notion of the relationship between cognitive structural development and moral understanding/behavior to argue that there are a defined number of cognitive structures, that develop in a series, that are tied to conceptions of "justice" in adolescents. Moreover, he claimed (convincingly to many) that these stages are universal across different societies.
This is by no means an exhaustive view of theories of moral development, but it is important to note the influence of Piaget and Kohlberg on current understandings of child social and emotional development. The notion of "service-learning" embodies this Kohlbergian constructivist-psychological framework (whether consciously or not). That is, service-learning, as a pedagogical approach, assumes that conceptions of justice and reciprocity are developing at a certain stage (K-12) and those conceptions may be enhanced through exposure to diverse environments. In fact, Kohlberg's theory applied in the educational context relies heavily on John Dewey's ideas of experiential education.
I would argue that this is precisely why we should care about the prevailing psycho-social view of "moral development": because this view is informing how children are educated in public schools. I will be exploring challenges to Kohlberg's theories in terms of actual pro-social behavior on the part of adolescents in a post later this week. For more on cognitive approaches to moral development see Colby, A. & Kohlberg, L. (1987) The measurement of moral judgment. Volume 1: Theoretical foundations and research validation.
Sunday, October 14, 2007
On Citizenship
What does it mean to be a "good citizen"? It is debatable that there was ever an answer to that question. Philosophers, political theorists and essayists have made names for themselves attempting to provide a definition of "citizenship", with varying degrees of success. These definitions, more often than not, explore the relationship between the citizen and the state. Sometimes, they are couched in the language of "rights" and "responsibilities". John Rawls has made a life's work extolling the virtues of the "deliberative democracy" where the citizen must actively participate in the affairs of state for democracy to be at its most efficient. To oversimplify, the citizen owes the state some form of payment in return for the state's protection. When we look at the Rawlsian citizen, service to the state is a defining characteristic.
This perspective is reflective of the overarching American narrative of citizenship. Beginning with William James' "Moral equivalent of War", American social discourse has emphasized a notion of sacrifice for the greater good. To be "good citizens", we must unite for a common cause, against a common enemy. The idea of self-denial as a path to a better country is bound up in American mythology, and consequently we turn to this idea when we want people to become more involved. Our politicians and community leaders call on a perceived sense of duty to inspire people to be "better citizens" and become involved in service activities.
Increasingly, however, it seems that we may be missing the point. The beauty of the overarching narrative is its simplicity and applicability. If all people in a society define themselves (at least in part) according to the same basic themes, then there is the potential to impact their behavior by appealing to those themes. But what if things don't work that way? What if individuals do not form their identities based on a set of limited, constant ideas. Post-modernists argue that the meta-narrative does not exist, and all that matters are personal narratives (another simplification). So now the question is, how do we appeal to millions of distinct personal narratives to influence individuals to be "good citizens"? Can we? Should we? Is there anything useful about "responsibilities" talk, and are we expecting too much from individuals?
This perspective is reflective of the overarching American narrative of citizenship. Beginning with William James' "Moral equivalent of War", American social discourse has emphasized a notion of sacrifice for the greater good. To be "good citizens", we must unite for a common cause, against a common enemy. The idea of self-denial as a path to a better country is bound up in American mythology, and consequently we turn to this idea when we want people to become more involved. Our politicians and community leaders call on a perceived sense of duty to inspire people to be "better citizens" and become involved in service activities.
Increasingly, however, it seems that we may be missing the point. The beauty of the overarching narrative is its simplicity and applicability. If all people in a society define themselves (at least in part) according to the same basic themes, then there is the potential to impact their behavior by appealing to those themes. But what if things don't work that way? What if individuals do not form their identities based on a set of limited, constant ideas. Post-modernists argue that the meta-narrative does not exist, and all that matters are personal narratives (another simplification). So now the question is, how do we appeal to millions of distinct personal narratives to influence individuals to be "good citizens"? Can we? Should we? Is there anything useful about "responsibilities" talk, and are we expecting too much from individuals?
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